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THE OVERCONFIDENCE EFFECT AND IT PROFESSIONALS 
Van Der Vyver, Glen, University of Southern Queensland, Department of Information 
Systems, West Street, 4350 Toowoomba, Australia, vandervy@usq.edu.au 
Abstract  
Information Technology has become a core activity in most, if not all, corporations. Although IT 
managers continue to be under-represented in executive management, the very centrality of 
information technology to corporate success or failure suggests that this situation cannot endure. It 
has been suggested that information technology managers are too narrowly focused and technically 
oriented for strategic roles in the corporation. A key skill required of the executive relates to making 
decisions in situations imbued with uncertainty. This paper examines a cognitive process, the 
overconfidence effect, which has been shown to influence good decision making. An analysis is 
presented as to the susceptibility of IT professionals to the overconfidence effect when compared to 
accounting / finance and marketing professionals. The results suggest that information technology 
professionals are as good, if not better, at making complex decisions as professionals from the other 
two groups. Information technology professionals proved to be moderately overconfident, a situation 
which has some advantages as well is disadvantages. The study indicated that information technology 
professionals have the decision making skills to take their rightful place at the most senior levels in 
corporations.  
Keywords: Overconfidence effect, decision making, IT management, heuristics. 
1 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT: IMPERATIVES FOR 
THE FUTURE 
Information Technology has traditionally played a supporting role in corporate activities, failing to 
achieve the degree of centrality which is its due. (Wiseman, 1988). Things are changing, however. 
Within the new organisation, information technology finds itself in an increasingly central and critical 
role. It has moved from the role of automator through the role of enabler to fill a role at the very core 
of a corporation's activities. Information technology will play an increasingly integral role in corporate 
activities as people recognise that information is an economic entity, even a depreciating asset. 
(Johnson and Carrico, 1988; Robson, 1994;  Marchand, 1997).  Morton (1988) argues that companies 
must rethink their core business in terms of IT capabilities and potential and that information 
technology must be viewed from the vantage point of the organisation's entire strategic context rather 
than from a  technical perspective. Choosing the right information technologies makes the difference 
between the organisation being a market leader or a follower and executives must be able to predict 
which information technologies are likely to have a major impact on their business  (Remenyi and 
Sutherland, 1993). 
Corporate procedures and plans for the acquisition, use and retention of information have become an 
important element in strategic planning. Although all managers will take on information-related 
responsibilities, IT professionals will play an important role in the formulation of an information 
strategy and in providing solutions to information-related problems. (Earl, 1997; Johnston and Carrico, 
1988). They will have to learn that it is not technological sophistication or the amount of money spent 
on technology that counts, but how well information technology aligns with business goals. (Collins 
and Poras, 1995; 1997; Wiseman and MacMillan, 1987). 
Robson (1994) examines some of the key factors which will determine the success of information 
technology departments in the coming decade. She believes that the tight integration of IT and 
corporate strategy is of great importance, arguing that a key feature of I.S. is the ability to 
accommodate rapid technological change. The challenge of the future lies in trying to ‘connect the 
exploitation of I.T., which is in itself complex, rapidly changing and often not well understood by 
managers, to development of business strategies where neither the principles or methods are agreed .'  
Information technology professionals will therefore require the ability to make informed decisions 
under conditions of uncertainty in the context of a rapidly changing, multi-faceted and unpredictable 
environment. This applies particularly to those whose responsibilities place them at the forefront of 
change - information technology managers. Rational decision making is however difficult in the 
dynamic modern environment. People consistently fall prey to decision errors of which they are 
usually oblivious (Simon, 1976). One of the most important of these is the overconfidence effect, 
whereby people are systematically overconfident about the outcomes of their decisions. This effect has 
been observed in experts and laypeople alike and can be a major impediment to sound decision 
making. (Clemen, 1990; Reichardt, 1992).  
On the other hand, a management team that is perennially afflicted by self-doubt and fearful of making 
the difficult decisions is perhaps even more likely to fail than a systematically overconfident team. 
Indeed, it is likely that a degree of overconfidence in the decisions one has taken will eventuate in 
higher levels of commitment to the outcomes of the decision, a generally positive outlook and a 
corporate approach to decision making that favours action over vacillation.  
Information Technology professionals would appear to be well prepared to take on a more central 
decision making role within the corporation. For decades, they have managed highly complex 
technologies, characterised by rapid and unpredictable change.  But, are they able to adapt these skills 
to decision making in a less technical and more strategic decision environment and, more crucially, 
convince others that they are sufficiently capable to take their rightful place at the highest strategic 
levels of corporations? There is little doubt that IT managers are underrepresented within the ranks of 
corporate executives and one of the reasons for this is likely to be the view that they do not have the 
necessary decision making skills (Stoner and Freeman, 1992; Robson, 1994; Wiseman, 1988). It is 
important that the IT profession actively seeks to dispel such notions. 
This study explores the decision making skills of Information Technology managers when faced with 
a decision environment that is ambiguous and unpredictable. In particular, the performance of IT 
professionals is compared to that of professionals working in marketing and accounting. The goal of 
the study is not to make definitive statements but to provide an indication of the comparative 
performance of a small group of IT professionals working on a set of hypothetical scenarios.  Because 
decision making is such a conceptually complex area subject to a wide range of influences, the study 
focuses on the overconfidence effect, a cognitive bias that has been shown to influence good decision 
making. It is hypothesised that resistance to this bias would indicate at least a potentiality towards 
sound decision making skills. 
2 DECISION MAKING: THE KEY SKILL 
Simon (1976) argued that management is decision making, and that the context of management is 
becoming increasingly uncertain and risky.  Today, it is a fundamental premise of management theory 
that good managers require well-developed decision making skills and the ability to make sound 
'judgment calls'. (Peters, 1993; Webber, 1997).  
An important premise which underpins virtually all modern management writing is the fact that the 
internal and external environment of business have become much more complex than was the case just 
a couple of decades ago, and that the level of complexity is increasing exponentially. (Peters, 1993). 
Complex environments necessitate high quality decision making, and place enormous demands on the 
individual. Not all people are able to make good decisions under such circumstances. In fact, it is 
almost certain that people who cannot adapt to ambiguity will make poor decisions. (Smart and 
Vertinsky, 1984; Webber, 1997).  
Webber (1997) refers to ‘the vision thing.’ He argues that many professionals today are so 
overwhelmed by the complexities of the task at hand that they struggle to make informed strategic 
decisions. They are unable to focus on issues unrelated to their area of expertise. He argues that future 
research is likely to indicate that individual differences determine decision making skill. Smart and 
Vertinsky (1984) examine the complex nature of the decision making skill and conclude that the 
ability to make good decisions is a variable of contextual elements and the psychological set of the 
individual making the decision.  
Although individual differences have dominated the research to date, it would be useful to study 
industries and occupational groups. The underlying premise of this line of enquiry is that while 
individual interests and ability play an important role in the choice of occupation, the skills acquired in 
an occupational role or in a particular industry are equally important. For instance, people in certain 
occupations might be asked to make more decisions and  be exposed to uncertain environments more 
frequently than others. These people might effectively learn to make good decisions and sound 
judgement calls.  
The traditional decision making techniques which are still widely used in companies are based upon 
the rational model of planning, strategy and structure. (Stoner and Freeman, 1992). Simon (1976) 
challenged the rational model, and much of the subsequent research in the area is based upon his work. 
First of all, he argued, good decision making is impossible without high quality information. Also, in 
the modern environment, the problems facing the corporation are frequently not well defined. Much of 
the information required does not even relate to making the decision, but to defining the problem. To 
make matters more difficult, humans are not capable of thinking rationally, limited by skills, 
intellectual ability,  knowledge, values, interests and a strong, unconscious irrational element in human 
behaviour. (Clemen, 1990; Hamel and Prahalad, 1994; Miller, 1992).  
Simon argues that decision makers do not even attempt to deal with the complexity of the real world. 
They seek to construct a simplified model of the world based upon their values, knowledge and 
experiences. Central to this process is the use of heuristics, or subconscious mental rules of thumb 
which allow us to make some sense of novel, ambiguous and uncertain problems. These heuristics are 
essential to the decision making process because they give some structure to an incomprehensible and 
unfathomable environment. They are often what stands between making a decision or hesitating in 
uncertainty. Decision makers also do not always seek the best or optimal course of action. They 
satisfice, or settle for the first reasonable alternative which presents itself.  
Walsh (1988) agrees with Simon that managers cannot cope with the complexities of the world 
without simplifying.  He argues that managers routinely confront ill-structured, complex problems that 
challenge their cognitive and information-processing capacities. These belief structures (or heuristics) 
are indispensable because in their absence individuals would be overwhelmed by an information world 
of staggering complexity. 
The work of Russo and Shoemaker (1990, 1991, 1992) suggests an important role for an overall 
heuristic called framing, where the decision maker structures the question in terms of a conceptual set, 
and where people use mental structures to simplify the world. People use these mental rules of thumb 
implicitly and subconsciously. Russo and Shoemaker argue that this process is both very useful and 
very dangerous. Everybody must construct mental frames of reference that simplify and structure the 
information encountered in an increasingly complex world. While this does allow them to make some 
sort of sense of a complex environment, it can lead to wildly inaccurate decisions. Often the partial 
view of the problem which the frame of reference encompasses precludes the identification of the 
correct course of action, literally forcing an incorrect decision. Alternatively, outdated rules of thumb 
may be used or  a particular rule of thumb may be applied to an inappropriate situation. Frames 
therefore give much needed boundaries to a problem, but many people make poor decisions because 
they see them as inviolate. They also tend to draw narrow boundaries around problem areas. A good 
decision maker is always looking outside the boundaries, ready to extend his frame of reference. 
Russo and Shoemaker (1991) identify some of the more common decision errors: 
• Plunging in, where information gathering and action begin immediately, without first thinking 
about the crux of the issues which are being addressed. 
• Frame blindness (framing), where mental frameworks make people oblivious or resistant to key 
information and closes them off from  many viable courses of action. 
• Overconfidence, which often causes people to fail to collect key factual information because they 
rely too much on their assumptions and opinions. 
• Shooting from the hip - people mistakenly believe that they can keep track of all the information 
they have collected and fail to adopt systematic choice procedures. 
• Group Failure - assuming that a group of clever people cannot make poor decisions. 
This study focuses on a particular heuristic - the overconfidence effect. Russo and Shoemaker (1990) 
argue that the overconfidence is one of the most important heuristics in the modern managerial 
context, and that the phenomenon can cause many organisational problems. They argue that not only 
are managers themselves overconfident, but they are also bombarded with information from other 
people who are also overconfident and whose judgements are prone to error - proposals, predictions, 
estimates and so on. A particularly  insidious side-effect of overconfidence is the confirmation bias. 
Because information which challenges our opinion would cause a degree of cognitive dissonance, we 
seek out confirmatory information. Russo and Shoemaker argue that overconfidence has been a hidden 
flaw in managerial decision making for many years and are of the opinion that the best decisions are 
made by those (few) people who possess metaknowledge, which is the ability to understand and 
appreciate the limits of one's knowledge.  
Overconfidence is not a phenomenon associated with laypeople alone. Studies have found that experts 
are often highly overconfident, sometimes about issues far removed from their field of expertise. 
(Bradley, 1981; Freudenberg, 1988; Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, 1977 and 1982 ). Bradley (1981) 
found that experts can be highly unreliable.  When faced with questions which were too difficult to 
answer, they would rather guess the answer than admit ignorance. Furthermore, they then expressed 
high degrees of confidence in their guesses. This tendency is exacerbated by the degree of perceived  
expertise. Experts can thus be at their most fallible when we need them most - that is, when the 
decision is very tricky. Freudenburg (1988) concedes that even scientists, who should be the most 
rational of all, fail to foresee all factors which can introduce error into judgements, especially when 
systems are complex and components related in unpredictable ways. They often also have excessive 
confidence in their estimates.  
Although the vast majority of studies on the overconfidence effect have focused on individuals, some 
studies have looked at industries and occupational groupings. The work of Russo and Shoemaker 
(1992) suggests here is evidence that people who work in certain professions have a higher degree of 
metaknowledge and are less prone to overconfidence than others. For example, they found that 
geologists, accountants and weather forecasters have a degree of resistance to conceptual bias, 
including overconfidence. Tomassini (1982) found that when experienced auditors provided estimates 
and confidence ranges for account balances, they were under confident rather than overconfident. He 
suggests that accountants may have learned to compensate for overconfidence because they spend so 
much of their time detecting fraud and error, and that the accounting profession is valued for its 
conservatism. 
Mahajan (1992) examined the marketing profession. He argues that estimating the likely occurrence of 
future events has become a critical aspect of a marketing manager’s role as a strategic decision maker. 
Should not people working in the dynamic, fluid and uncertain environment of marketing handle 
overconfidence better than most?  Although there are a growing  number of analytical techniques 
which help managers cope with uncertainty, such as cost-benefit and decision tree analysis, Mahajan 
found that these played only a minor role in reducing the impact of biased decision making and that 
marketing managers are susceptible to the overconfidence effect. He found that overconfidence was 
not a random phenomenon, but appeared consistently and systematically. More important, those 
managers who are the most confident are also the most likely to act upon their decisions and commit 
resources without considering additional information. 
3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This study compares the ability to make predictions and expressed level of confidence in those 
predictions of information technology professionals and managers to that of  marketing and  
accounting / finance professionals and managers. Previous research (discussed above) suggests that 
accountants are relatively well calibrated in terms of the level of confidence they have in their 
decisions while marketing professionals are likely to be overconfident.  
The study addresses the following questions: 
1. Are information technology professionals more accurate at making judgement calls and predictions 
under conditions of uncertainty when compared to accounting and marketing professionals ? 
2  Are information technology professionals overconfident in their judgement calls and predictions 
when compared to accounting and marketing professionals ? 
3. Are information technology professionals overconfident in their judgements when their response 
accuracy rates are taken into account ? That is, are their levels of confidence significantly higher than 
their accuracy levels. An important term in this context is calibration, which refers to the degree of 
concurrence between accuracy level and confidence level. Thus, when a person is well calibrated there 
is a significant correlation between accuracy rates and confidence levels. The overconfidence effect 
will, of course, always involve poor calibration, as there is by definition a significant discontinuity 
between accuracy levels and confidence levels.  
The overall methodology used is based upon the studies of Dunning and Griffin (1990), Kahneman 
and Tversky (1974), Klein and Kunda (1994), Mahajan (1992),  and Russo and Shoemaker (1992, 
1993). The study used a single questionnaire comprising of three scenarios, each depicting a situation 
of uncertainty. These scenarios were developed specifically for this study. The first scenario 
introduces a complex futures trading decision with attendant climatic and environmental uncertainties. 
The second scenario involves making a number of decisions / predictions concerning the 
establishment of a greenfield enterprise. The third scenario involves making a number of decisions / 
predictions relating to the usage of a technology which has many benefits but also some potentially 
serious risks. Participants were asked to answer question based upon each situation and then, on a five-
point scale, express a level of confidence in their answers. They were allowed 30 minutes to complete 
the task, which introduced a time constraint. They were allowed to use a pen and paper but not a 
calculator. Each question had a correct answer so that accuracy could be assessed objectively. The 
complexity of the scenarios, the number of questions involved and the limited amount of time 
available made it highly unlikely that participants would have sufficient time to rationally assess the 
implications of each scenario.  
All the respondents were IT professionals, accounting / finance professionals or marketing 
professionals. Approximately half of the respondents hold positions in middle management or higher. 
The design of the study guarantees anonymity for all respondents. The respondents were drawn from 
groups to which the researcher has access, as follows: 
• Members of staff in the IT and finance departments working in a large bank . 
• University students in full-time employment.  
It is important to realise that no instrument of this nature is capable of replicating a real decision environment. 
Indeed, the questions do not deal with decisions per se, but with the type of judgement calls which are frequently 
a contextual element of decision making. Even when a scenario which requires a decision is presented, that 
decision is highly artificial and has no tangible consequences. Virtually all previous studies have, however, 
relied upon these types of questionnaires. 
3.1 Hypotheses 
The study formally tests the following hypotheses: 
1. The level of confidence in the accuracy of predictions is not significantly different 
between information technology professionals and  accounting / finance professionals. 
2. The level of confidence in the accuracy of predictions is not significantly different 
between information technology professionals and  marketing professionals. 
3.  There is no relationship between accuracy of prediction and the level of     confidence in 
prediction. 
3.2 Methodological constraints  
This research report is not in any way intended to be definitive. The test statistic and analytical 
methodology employed should be evaluated with regard to the following potential problems: 
A. Sample Size 
The sample size is relatively small. 
B. Potential Sampling Bias 
The respondents in this study were not randomly selected. They selected themselves in that they 
belonged to groups readily available to the researcher. It is possible that a small number of 
respondents significantly skewed the distribution of scores. 
C. Control 
The questionnaire is fairly difficult and somewhat time-consuming. It was relatively difficult to 
persuade some people to participate. It is therefore possible that some respondents became tired or 
were not sufficiently interested to begin with. 
4 RESULTS  
The questionnaire was administered to 31 accounting / finance professionals, 31 information 
technology professionals and 31 marketing professionals. Where more than 31 people volunteered 
from a particular profession, the numbers were reduced via random selection. The majority of the 
respondents hold positions in senior and middle management, and no respondent has less than three 
years professional experience. All respondents were timed and the questionnaires were administered 
under the supervision of the researcher.  The data was analysed using SPSS. 
The results were as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: (The level of confidence in the accuracy of predictions is not significantly different 
between information technology professionals and  accounting / finance professionals.) 
An analysis of the data indicates that the null hypothesis should be rejected at the 0.05 level of 
significance. Indeed, at the .003 level of significance (two-tailed) the null hypothesis is rejected. The 
results therefore suggest that there is a significant difference in the level of confidence between IT 
professionals and accounting professionals. IT professionals, with a mean level of confidence of 
3.4184 on a five-point scale, exhibit a significantly higher level of confidence in their predictions than 
accounting professionals, with a mean confidence score of 2.8458. Of note, at the 0.05 level of 
significance there was no difference between the two groups as regards the accuracy of prediction. 
 
 
   Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
    F Sig. t Df Sig. (2-tailed)   




.612 .437 3.051 60 .003   
  Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
    3.051 59.339 .003   
Table 1.   Confidence in Prediction: IT versus Accounting group 
 
Hypothesis 2: The level of confidence in the accuracy of predictions is not significantly different 
between information technology professionals and  marketing professionals. 
An analysis of the data indicates that the null hypothesis should be rejected at the 0.05 level of 
significance. Indeed, at the .011 level of significance (two-tailed) the null hypothesis is rejected. The 
results therefore suggest that there is a significant difference in the level of confidence in between IT 
professionals and marketing professionals. IT professionals, with a mean level of confidence of 3.4184 
on a five-point scale, exhibit a significantly lower level of confidence in their predictions than 
marketing professionals, with a mean confidence score of 3.8555. At the 0.05 level of significance 
there was also a difference between the two groups as regards the accuracy of prediction. Of particular 
interest is the fact that the IT group had a significantly higher level of overall accuracy.  
 
 
   Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
    F Sig. T Df Sig. (2-tailed)   




.657 .421 -2.639 60 .011   
  Equal 
variances not 
assumed 
    -2.639 58.719 .011   
Table 2.  Confidence in Prediction: IT versus Marketing group 
 
Hypothesis 3: (There is no relationship between accuracy of prediction and the level of confidence in 
prediction.) 
An analysis of the data indicates that, for the IT group, there is a significant positive correlation 
between accuracy of prediction and the level of confidence exhibited in that prediction. By 
comparison with the correlation of .371 for IT professionals, accounting professionals did not exhibit a 
significant relationship (with  a correlation of -.031). Although marketing professionals did not attain 
significantly different levels of accuracy when compared to the other groups, their higher levels of 
confidence resulted in a significant negative correlation between accuracy and confidence (-.289).  
 




  Sig. (2-tailed) . .040 




  Sig. (2-tailed) .040 . 
  N 31 31 
Table 3.  Correlation between confidence and accuracy in prediction for IT group 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
Information technology professionals are not yet reaching the executive levels of corporations in 
sufficient numbers, especially given the core importance of IT to most corporations. Accounting and 
finance professionals continue to be strongly represented within the ranks of corporate executives and, 
particularly in the last decade, professionals from areas such as marketing and core line areas have 
gained significant ground. There is little doubt that there are those who view IT managers as narrowly 
focused ‘tecchies’ who do not have the breadth of knowledge or decision making skills to succeed at 
the executive level.   
The information systems professionals who participated in this study were something of a revelation. 
They were more accurate in making judgements about decision environments imbued with uncertainty 
than the other groups and their levels of confidence in their judgment calls were surprisingly well 
calibrated. 
The results of the study support previous work with accounting and marketing professionals. Those 
involved in accounting exhibited a balanced, even conservative view of their own decision making 
capabilities, the group as a whole scoring very near the boundary between over / under confidence. 
Marketing professionals, on the other hand, were systematically and significantly overconfident. At 
the same time, their predictions were the least accurate of the three groups, although this may be due 
to the fact that the scenarios were more alien to them than to the other groups. 
The IT professionals were substantially overconfident in their own judgements under conditions of 
uncertainty but a significant proportion of this overconfidence was accounted for by actual 
performance. In effect, they were saying: ‘We are good at this.’ – and they were! It must be conceded 
that the level of confidence was somewhat higher than the level of performance but this may not be a 
bad thing. As was mentioned above, high levels of overconfidence are likely to have many adverse 
consequences but a modest level of overconfidence can actually be beneficial for performance and 
future decision making. The moderately overconfident person is more likely to take the well measured 
and balanced risks required of so many key entrepreneurial decisions and to feel positive about the 
outcomes. 
A number of issues should be addressed before any conclusions are made about a study of this nature: 
• The study uses artificial decision environments. Behaviour could differ significantly if the 
decisions was real. 
• Unknown conceptual processes may be at work. 
•  It was sometimes difficult to sustain interest and concentration. 
• It is difficult to validate the questions. 
• There are very few applied studies to use as a resource.  
• Very little work has been done to establish exactly what happens after overconfident decisions are 
made.  
• In this study, the IT group in particular was drawn from a relatively narrow base in terms of 
previous experience and industry type.  
With due regard to the constraints mentioned the study indicates that IT professionals are moderately 
susceptible to the overconfidence heuristic. It  would appear that information technology professionals 
have a degree of tolerance for ambiguity and uncertainty, and are capable of making reasonable 
judgements calls, more so when the key skills required by the decision situation are intuitive in nature 
(rather than logical). On a comparative basis, the IT professionals fared best in the area of 
metaknowledge. 
This study suggests that IT professionals have the potential and capability to be effective decision 
makers and executives. Although susceptible to some conceptual biases, they did perform at least as 
well overall as representatives from two occupational groups which account for the majority of CEO's 
in many major corporations. This lends support to the contention that IT professionals are ready to 
take on roles with greater strategic responsibility.  
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